Federal Labor Law Preemption and Right to Hire Permanent Replacements: Belknap, Inc. v. Hale by Collins, Kimberly M
Boston College Law Review
Volume 26
Issue 1 Number 1 Article 2
12-1-1984
Federal Labor Law Preemption and Right to Hire
Permanent Replacements: Belknap, Inc. v. Hale
Kimberly M. Collins
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons
This Casenotes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kimberly M. Collins, Federal Labor Law Preemption and Right to Hire Permanent Replacements:
Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 26 B.C.L. Rev. 63 (1984), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol26/iss1/2
CASENOTES
Federal Labor Law Preemption and Right to Hire Permanent Replacements: Belknap,
Inc. v. Hale' — The Supreme Court has created two doctrines for analyzing preemption
problems when state law conflicts with federal labor law.' The first, the Garmon 3 doctrine,
applies to disputes over conduct regulated by the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"
or "Act"). 4
 Under the Garman doctrine state action regulating conduct also regulated by
federal labor law is preempted.' The second, the Machinists (' doctrine, applies to state
action concerning conduct related to labor disputes but not arguably regulated by the
NLRA.7
 If the conduct subject to state action appears to have been intentionally left
unregulated by Congress the state regulation is preempted under the Machinists doctrine. 6
Whichever doctrine is applied to a labor action filed in state court, the result has been
either to allow the state jurisdiction over the action or to preempt it completely. 6 In the
recent case of Belknap, Inc. v. Hale,'° however, the Supreme Court fashioned a middle
ground when it permitted state action regulating an employer's hiring of strike replace-
ments to go forward but then proceeded to change the federal common law concerning
such hiring so that employers could avoid future liability in those state actions." The
Court attempted to preserve both a state's ability to regulate and the labor activity." In
reaching this result the Court altered the Machinists doctrine.' 3 Previously, under
Machinists, if the Court found that Congress intended the challenged conduct to remain
unregulated, neither state nor federal regulation was permitted." In Belknap, the Court
deviated from its prior articulation of the Machinists doctrine by introducing a balancing
test to its analysis. This balancing test was used to determine whether a state action
regulating an employer's economic weapon would be permitted despite Congress's intent
that such conduct be left unregulated.' 5
 While sustaining the state action the Belknap
Court also altered the terms under which the employer could hire replacement workers.''
' 103 S. Ct..3172 (1983).
Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 103 S. Ct. at 3176-77.
3
 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
• Belknap, 103 S. Ct. at 3176-77; National Labor Relations Act, § 1, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982).
Belknap, 103 S. Ct. at 3176-77.
6
 Lodge 76, International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin Em-
ployment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Machinists].
7
 Id. at 141. See also Belknap, 103 S. Ct. at 3176-77.
• Machinists, 427 U.S. at 141.
• See,e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180
(1978) (state action for trespass held not preempted); Machinists, 427 U.S. 132 (1976) (state action to
enjoin union and its members from continuing to refuse to work overtime pursuant to union policy
to put economic pressure on the employer held preempted); Gannon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) (state
action against peaceful picketing preempted).
'° 103 S. Ct. 3172 (1983).
" Id. at 3176-82.
" Id.
13 ,rd,
11 427 U.S. at 141.
'' 103 S. Ct. at 3176-82. The economic weapon at issue was the employer's right to hire
permanent replacements. Id.; see also id. at 3191 (Brennan, J. dissenting). In Machinists the Court
recognized that Congress intended economic weapons "to be 'unrestricted by any governmental
power to regulate."' 427 U.S. at 141 (emphasis in the original).
'" Id. at 3180-81 & n.9.
63
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In Belknap the Court stated that the employer could avoid reinstating strikers by making
conditioned offers of employment rather than permanent offers to replacements.' 7
The controversy in Belknap began on January 31, 1978 when the Teamsters Local
Union No. 89 ("Union"), the exclusive bargaining representative of Belknap's warehouse
and maintenance workers, called a strike at Belknap, Inc.'s Belknap and the Union began
negotiating a new contract shortly before the expiration of the existing contract, but then
reached impasse.'" When the existing agreement between Belknap and the Union ex-
pired on January 31, 1978 approximately 400 Belknap employees went on strike the
following day.'"
In response to the strike, Belknap granted a wage increase the same day to any
employees who remained on the job." Belknap also began advertising for permanent
replacements for the striking union employees." Belknap issued a letter to all the hired
replacements which stated that Belknap would not discharge the permanent replace-
ments to provide jobs for the striking employees when the strike ended.'" One month
later, the permanent replacements received another letter reassuring them that there
would be no change in their employment stattis.' 4 The Union filed charges with the
National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or "Board") on March 7, 1978 claiming that the
wage 'increase offered union employees who did not participate in the strike constituted
an unfair labor practice." Belknap countered with its own unfair labor practice charges
against the Union."'
The Board's Regional Director issued a complaint against Belknap asserting that the
wage increase violated the National Labor Relations Act."' A settlement conference was
' 7 Id. Under the rule set forth in NLRB v. Mackay Radio and Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333,
345-47 (1983), an employer had to make permanent offers of employment to replacements to avoid
the requirement of reinstating strikers. See also NLRB v. Mars Sales & Equipment Co., 626 F.2d 567
(7th Cir. 1980).
'" 103 S. Ct. at 3174.
1 " Brief for Petitioner, at 4, Belknap, 103 S. Ct. 3172 (1983). The International Brotherhood of
Teamsters Local No. 89 was certified by the NLRB as the workers' exclusive bargaining representa-
tive on October 10, 1974. Id.
" 103 S. Ct. at 3174.
2L Id .
23 Id, The advertisement read:
Permanent Employees Wanted. Belknap, Inc., 111 East Main Street, Louisville, Ken-
tucky.
Openings available for qualified persons looking for employment to permanently
replace striking warehouse and maintenance employees.
Excellent earnings, fringe benefits and working conditions with steady year-round
employment.
Minimum starting rate $4.55 per hour. Top rate $5.85, depending on skill, ability
and experience. Plus incentive earnings over hourly rate for most jobs. Apply in person
at the Belknap Office located at III East Main Street between 9:00 a.m. and 2:30 p.m.,
Monday thru Friday. Park in company lot at 1st and Main.
We are an equal opportunity employer.
103 S. Ct. at 3174-75 n.l.
23 Id. at 3174-76. The replacement employees signed a form stating they were hired to replace
permanently the employee whose name appeared on the form. Id. at 3175-76.
" Id.
95 Id. The Union's charges were filed after some of the replacements were hired but before
Belknap issued its letter reassuring replacements of their permanent status. Id.
28 id.
22 Id. The complaint asserted that Belknap violated sections 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3), and 8(a)(5) of the
NLRA, which provide in relevant part:
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convened by the Regional Director shortly before the unfair labor practice hearing
scheduled for July 19." At this conference Belknap and the Union settled the strike and
the NLRB dropped the unfair labor practice charges."9 As part of the settlement Belknap
agreed to recall all the striking employees at a minimum rate of thirty-five persons per
week.3° Consequently, Belknap discharged all the replacements, including the twelve
respondents, to make room for the returning strikers:31
After being discharged by Belknap, twelve of the replacements sued Belknap in
Kentucky Circuit Court for misrepresentation and breach of contract . 3 ' Their complaint
alleged that Belknap knowingly and falsely stated that it was hiring the replacements as
permanent employees and that Belknap knew the replacements would rely on those
statements to their detriment." Alternatively, the replacements claimed that Belknap
breached its contract with the replacements by firing them as a result of its settlement with
the Union . 34
In response to the suit, Belknap moved for summary judgment on the grounds that
the respondent's causes of action were preempted by the NLRA. 33 The Circuit Court
allowed Belknap's motion."
The replacements appealed the Circuit Court's decision and the Kentucky Court of
Appeals reversed, finding no cause for preemption . 37 Preemption was inappropriate, the
appeals court held, because Belknap's actions, the firing of the replacements, were not
unfair labor practices and therefore not subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the
NLRB." The appeals court also held that the contract and misrepresentation claims
should be sustained because they are deeply rooted in local law and of only peripheral
concern to the federal labor law," The United States Supreme Court granted Belknap's
petition for certiorari. 40
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 157 of this title; . .
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organi-
zation; ..
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject
to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title.
29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), 158(a)(3), 158(a)(5) (1982).
2 ' Belknap, 103 S. Ct. at 3175-76.
29 Id .
3° Id. at 3176.
3 ' Id.
3" Id. The Kentucky Circuit Court is the state trial court. Id
33 Id.
34 Id. Each of the Respondents asked for $250,000 in compensatory damages and $250,000 in
punitive damages. Id.
Id. Belknap had first sought removal to federal court, but its motion was denied. Id.
3° Id.
37 Id.
3° Id. The Court of Appeals found that Belknap's actions were not unfair labor practices
prohibited by 29 U.S.C, § 158(a)(3), which prohibits discrimination in personnel decisions for the
purpose of encouraging or discouraging membership in a particular union, since the replacements
did not seek membership in any labor organization. Id. The Kentucky Supreme Court granted
discretionary review, but later vacated its own order which it determined to have been improvidently
granted. Id.
39 Id.
4' Id. The United States Supreme Court found it had jurisdiction because the judgment of the
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In a six-to-three decision" the Court affirmed the ruling of the Kentucky Court of
Appeals and held that the NLRA does not preempt state causes of action for misrepresen-
tation and breach of contract by strike replaCements who are later fired." Testing the
state regulation of the employer's economic weapon under both the Garmon and
Machinists doctrines, the Court held that neither doctrine preempted the state court suit. 43
The Garmon doctrine did not apply, the Court found, because the state causes of action
were not identical to an action which could have been brought before the NLRB.44
Applying the Machinists doctine, the Court found that although the hiring of replace-
ments met the traditional Machinists test of being conduct Congress intentionally left
unregulated, it would not preempt the state suit." Instead, the Court found that when
applying the Machinists doctrine courts should also weigh the impact on "innocent third
parties."" Under this modified Machinists doctrine the Court held that the state actions
were not preempted. 47
 The majority concluded that allowing the replacement employees'
claims to proceed in state court would not alter or hinder the employer's right under
federal law to hire permanent replacements during an economic strike. 48
 Finally, the
majority held that even if the employer's conduct constituted an unfair labor practice the
state court suit would not interfere with the ability of the Board to adjudicate the dispute
and provide remedies."
Belknap v. Hale is significant as the first case to assert the rights of third parties to a
labor dispute. Applying the Machinists and Gannon preemption doctrines, the Belknap
Court sustained state court actions concerning an employer's job offers to the replace-
ment workers. Therefore, an employer who lawfully uses an economic weapon in a labor
dispute may be liable for the effect on neutral third parties.50
 In the process of reaching
this decision the Court altered the Machinists preemption doctrine by introducing a new
test which requires the courts to balance state and federal interests. 5 ' Adding this test
opens the door for increased state causes of action in labor disputes. The Belknap Court
made another important change in the law when it stated that an employer could lawfully
refuse reinstatement to strikers if it makes conditional job offers to the replacements."
Kentucky Court of Appeals was final regarding its determination of the preemption issue. 103 S. Ct.
at 3175-76 n.5. A reversal by the Supreme Court, the Court reasoned, would have terminated the
state court action. Id. The Court noted, moreover, that to permit state court proceedings to continue
without resolving the preemption issue would risk interference with the federal statutory policy of
requiring the Board, not the state courts, to hear the subject matter of the respondents' cause. Id. at
3176 n.5.
41 Justice White authored the opinion of the Court in which Chief Justice Burger, and Justices
Rehnquist, Stevens, and O'Connor joined. Justice Blackmun filed a concurring opinion. Justice
Brennan wrote a dissenting opinion which Justices Marshall and Powell joined. Id. at 3174.
" Id. at 3174, 3184-86.	 -
" Id. at 3172, 3174-78.
" Id. at 3177.
45 Id.
" Id. at 3178.
" Id. at 3181.
" Id. at 3177-79.
49 Id. at 3184-85.
5' Id. at 3177-78.
" The Court considered the state's interest in protecting innocent third parties from misrep-
resentations. Id. at 3177-82.
" Id. at 3177-82, 3180-81 n.9.
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Permitting conditional offers leaves the employer with greater flexibility and strengthens
its position in a strike."
This casenote will first present an overview of federal labor law governing the
regulation of labor preemption and economic weapons generally." Next it will set forth
the reasoning of the various opinions in Belknap." To evaluate the reasoning of Belknap,
the Court's use of the Gannon and Machinists preemption doctrines in Belknap will then be
analyzed." The casenote will focus on the ineffectiveness of the Garman doctrine, as
restricted by later decisions, in preempting state actions which conflict with federal labor
policy. 57
 Also given particular attention will be the Court's alteration of the Machinists
doctrine by introducing the state and federal interests balancing test to that doctrine."
Finally, the effect of Belknap on an employer's right to hire permanent replacements will
be examined." The Court's decision preserves both the employer's economic weapon and
the replacement workers' remedies in state court instead of choosing between them. This •
casenote concludes that the Courts' action has resulted in dilution of the effectiveness of
the Machinists doctrine and an unwarranted adjustment in the balance of power between
labor and management.
I. FEDERAL LABOR LAW PREEMPTION AND REGULATION OF ECONOMIC WEAPONS
Belknap involved the question of whether certain state actions were preempted by
federal labor law. The Supremacy Clause provides that federal laws supersede any
conflicting provision of a state constitution or state law.6" A state law which regulates or
infringes on a federally created right, therefore, falls to the superior federal law."'
Federal law also preempts state law in any area where federal regulation is so pervasive
that it precludes any state regulation. 62
 With the passage of the National Labor Relations
Act in 1935, Congress established such comprehensive regulation of the labor law field
that state regulation is preempted in this area." 3 The stated purpose of the Act is the
elimination of obstructions to the flow of interstate commerce caused by labor-
management disputes." As part of its effort to accomplish this objective the NLRA
encourages collective bargaining and self-organization by workers." 5
" Id. "The Court's change in the law of permanency weakens the rights of strikers and
undermines the protection afforded those rights by the Act." Id. at 3198 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" See infra notes 69-131 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 136-250 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 261-74 and accompanying text.
57 See infra notes 273-75 and accompanying text.
w See infra notes 275.90 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 292-315 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 316-23 and accompanying text.
81
 U.S. CONST. art. VI. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in pursuance thereof; ... shall be the supreme law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwith-
standing." Id. See also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 17 (1824) ("[N]or should the states
encroach on ground which the public good, as well as the constitution, refers to the exclusive control
of Congress.").
" Id.
63 State v. McHorse, 85 N.M. 753, 757, 517 P.2d 75, 79 (1973).
" National Labor Relations Act, § I, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982). See also Garner v. Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, and Helpers Local Union, 346 U.S. 485, 488-91 (1953).
es National Labor Relations Act, § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982):
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In enacting this statute, Congress also established the National Labor Relations
Board and vested it with exclusive jurisdiction over cases arising under the NLRA. 66 Both
federal and state courts are, therefore, precluded from intervening in disputes over
conduct regulated by the NLRA." The exclusive jurisdiction of the Board prevents
conflicting or incompatible adjudications and remedies resulting in cases involving the
same type of activity. 66
As indicated previously, the Supreme Court uses two doctrines to evaluate preemp-
tion problems arising when state and federal labor law conflict. 69 Preemption issues
emanating from conduct regulated by the NLRA are analyzed according to the principles
set forth by the Court in San Diego Building Trades Council a Garmon." Questions pre-
sented by conduct which Congress intended to be unregulated by both federal and state
law are decided by using the test the Court established in Lodge 76, International Association
of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission. 7 ' The next
two subsections of this casenote will discuss the Garmon and the Machinists doctrines in
turn. These two doctrines will then be examined as applied to the right of employers to
hire permanent replacements during a strike.
A. Preemption and Conduct Covered By the NLRA — The Garmon Cases
The foundation of the Garmon doctrine was laid by an early Supreme Court labor
case, Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs, and Helpers Local Union." in Garner the Court held
that the NLRA preempted a state court from enjoining union picketing which violated a
state law." Later cases extended this preemption doctrine. In San Diego Building Trades
Council v. Garmon" the Court held that where an activity is at least arguably protected or
prohibited by the NLRA state action is preempted." In Garmon the California Supreme
Court had sustained an award of damages for union picketing which it found to be in
violation of section 8 of the NLRA." The violation had not been adjudicated by the Board
as it had declined to exercise its jurisdiction." The United States Supreme Court re-
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of
certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and
eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and
procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full
freedom of association, self•organization, and designation of representatives of their
own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their em-
ployment or other mutual aid or protection.
Id. Section 7 of the Act guarantees employees the right to self-organization, to choose and
bargain collectively through representatives, and to engage in concerted activities for mutual aid and
protection. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). Section 8 of the Act makes it an unfair labor practice to interfere
with an employee's exercise of his section 7 rights, to encourage or discourage union membership, or
to refuse to bargain collectively with a union representative. 29 U.S,C, § 158 (1982). See also Sears, 436
U.S. at 190-91.
National Labor Relations Act § 3, 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1982). See also Garner, 346 U.S. at 490-91.
se Garner, 346 U.S. at 490-91.
" Id.
" See supra notes 2-7 and accompanying text.
71 103 S. Ct. at 3177-78; see Garman, 359 U.S. at 236, 244-45; see also Sears, 436 U.S. at 197.
n Belknap, 103 S. Ct. at 3177-78. See Machinists, 427 U.S. at 148-51.
" 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
" Id. at 498-501.
" 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
76 Id. at 245.
77 Id. at 238-39.
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versed, holding that the state court was not free to regulate this activity even if the NLRB
had failed to assert its jurisdiction." In explanation the Court maintained that to allow the
states to control activities potentially subject to federal regulation involved too great a
danger of conflict with national labor policy."
The Garmon Court, however, did identify some exceptions to the preemption rule.'
When the activity is only of peripheral concern to the Act, the Court commented, the state
power to regulate is not preempted."' State regulation is also allowed where the regulated
conthict touches interests of great local concern and responsibility." The Court reasoned
that in such local matters it could not infer that Congress had deprived the state of power
to act."
In a more recent case, Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County District Council of
Carpenters," the Supreme Court modified the Garmon test of arguably protected or
prohibited conduct and expanded the potential area of state regulation." The Sears Court
stated that the test for deciding when a state cause of action is preempted is whether the
controversy presented to the state court is identical to the dispute which could have been
presented to the NLRB." Sears Roebuck had brought a trespass action against the
Carpenters Union after the union picketed on Sears property to protest Sears' use of
non-union carpenters." The California Supreme Court, relying on Gannon, ruled that the
state trespass action was preempted by the NLRA. 88 The United States Supreme Court
reversed, stating that only when the stated cause of action is identical to an action which
could be adjudicated by the Board is the action preempted." Exercise of jurisdiction over
the action by the state court, the Court explained, would not conflict or interfere with the
NLRB's jurisdiction."
The Sears Court articulated the new preemption test after reviewing the numerous
cases in which the Court had found exceptions to Gannon and had sustained state action
which met the Gannon arguably-regulated test."' In the cases following Garmon, the Court
noted, it had refused to apply the Gannon rule in a literal, mechanical fashion." Instead,
7" Id.
Id. at 246.
so Id.
81 Id. at 243-44.
" Id. See also Intl Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 620 (1958).
" 359 U.S. at 244.
" The Court stated that:
[Djue regard for the presuppositions of our embracing federal system, ... has required
us not to find withdrawal from the States of power to regulate where the activity
regulated was a merely peripheral concern of the Labor Management Relations Act ....
Or where the regulated conduct touched interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and
responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, we could not
infer that Congress had deprived the States of the power to act.
Id. at 243-44 (citations omitted).
" 436 U.S. 180 (1978).
" See Comment, State Actions for Wrongful Discharge: Overcoming Barriers Posed by Federal Labor
Law Preemption, 71 CAL. L. REV. 942, 954 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Wrongful Discharge];
see also infra notes 91 - 96 and accompanying text.
87 436 U.S. at 197, 209.
88 Id. at 182-83.
88 Id. at 183-84.
" Id. at 197.
" Id.
Id. it 188-89.
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the Sears Court noted, the Court had balanced the nature of the interests asserted and the
effect of the state court adjudication upon the administration of national labor policy. 93
By restricting the inquiry to whether a direct conflict exists with the Board's jurisdic-
tion, the Supreme Court, in Sears, cut back on the arguably-regulated Gannon test.94 State
actions which might have been preempted under Gannon as being arguably under the
NLRA and therefore potentially within the Board's jurisdiction may be sustained under
Sears Under the Sears test the conduct must be.definitely within the Board's jurisdiction
before the state cause of action will be preempted."
B. Preemption and Conduct Not Regulated by the NLRA
Gannon and Sears only created rules to analyze conduct regulated by the NLRA. 97
Other activities, though unregulated by the NLRA, may be an integral part of federal
labor policy." The Supreme Court originally stated that state regulation of such activity
was not preempted but later abandoned this approach deciding that federal labor policy
prohibited state regulation of such conduct. 99 The Supreme Court first discussed the
preemption of state regulation of conduct related to a labor dispute but not regulated by
the NLRA in the so-called Briggs-Stratton'" case, which arose before the Court had
established any labor preemption doctrines.'°' In Briggs-Stratton the Wisconsin Employ-
ment Relations Board ordered a union to cease its "quickie" strikes." ).2 Because the strikes
were neither protected nor prohibited by the NLRA, the Court upheld the state board
action ' °3 and ruled that the state action was not preempted.'" The Court explained that
the strikes could be regulated by the state because they would be entirely unregulated in
the absence of state regulation." Accordingly, the state was allowed to apply its laws to
restrict the strikes."
Several years later, the Supreme Court abandoned the Briggs-Stratton approach in
Lodge 76, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers a. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Commission .'" In that case the Supreme Court reversed the Wisconsin Employ-
ment Relations Board's injunction against a union's refusal to work overtime pursuant to
its policy to put economic pressure on an employer during contract negotiations.'" The
Machinists Court found that certain labor activities, typically economic weapons, were
'intentionally left unregulated by Congress.' State regulation of such weapons, the Court
" Id. at 188.
" Id. at 188-89.
as Id.
96 Id. at 197.
97 Id .
" See supra notes 69-96 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 109-14 and accompanying text.
nx' See infra notes 100- 110 and accompanying text.
International Union, UAW, Local 232 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245
(1949). This case is named for the Briggs & Stratton Corporation at which the work stoppages at
issue took place. Id. at 248.
I " Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 ilartv. L. REV. 1338, 1346 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Cox].
I n 336 U.S, at 248. These strikes were intermittent, unannounced work stoppages. Id.
104 Id. at 254.
105 id
190 Id.
1 " Id. at 265.
427 U.S. 132 (1976).
Id. at 133.
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concluded, is therefore preempted by a federal labor policy against any regulation in the
area."°
In the case before it the Machinists Court found that the union's application of
economic pressure by refusing to work overtime was a form of economic self-help that
was "part and parcel of the process of collective bargaining" which Congress intentionally
left unregulated."' This economic weapon, the Court noted, was to be governed by the
free play of economic forces."' The Machinists Court found that Congress has been
specific when it has outlawed the use of particular economic weapons by unions. 13
 The
availability of economic weapons permitted by federal law, the Court commented, should
not be dependent on the forum in which the opponent presses his clairrts." 4 A party
affected by a labor dispute, the Court stated, is not without recourse if the state law is
preempted."' In Machinists, the Court observed, the employer could have employed its
own form of economic pressure." Because self-help was available, the Court explained,
depriving the employer of its state court remedy was not unjust."' For these reasons, the
Court held that activities not covered by federal law may not be regulated by state law if
Congress intentionally failed to regulate the activity as part of federal labor law policy. 118
C. Preemption and the Economic Weapon of Hiring Replacement Workers
In Belknap the Court addressed the issue of whether a state could regulate an
employer's hiring of replacement workers during a strike. Because the right to hire
replacements is recognized as an employer's economic weapon under federal labor law
the Court employed both the Garmon and Machinists preemption doctrines to resolve the
issue." 9
 Under the Garmon doctrine the Court considered whether Belknap's conduct in
hiring the replacements was arguably regulated by the NLRA.'" Under the Machinists
doctrine the Court considered whether a state could regulate the hiring of replacements,
conduct intentionally left unregulated by Congress.in Before analyzing the application of
either the Garmon or Machinists doctrines to Belknap's hiring of permanent replacements
the nature of this economic weapon must first be examined. The employer who uses its
right to hire replacements releases himself from the obligation of reinstating strikers
whose jobs have been filled.'" By hiring permanent replacements, therefore, the em-
ployer pressures the union to end the strike quickly while jobs remain open.'"
'" Id. at 136, 141, 149 n.10. Between the labor activities protected by the NLRA and the unfair
labor practices prohibited by the NLRA lies a gap in which labor and management are free to fight
out their differences with economic weapons unrestricted by federal law. Economic weapons include
conduct such as slowdowns, quickie strikes, and lockouts. Cox, supra note 97, at 1346. In Belknap the
economic weapon was the hiring of permanent replacements.
111
 427 U.S. at 140 & n.4.
" 2 Id. at 149 (quoting NLRB v. Insurance Agents, 361 U.S. 477, 495 (1960)). See also New York
Tel. Co. v. New York State Dept. of Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 531 (1979).
I " 427 U.S. at 149-50.
" 4 Id. at 143.
"5 Id. at 153.
"6 Id. at 152-53.
"7 Id. For example, the employer could have fired the union employees. Id.
1 " Id.
"9 1d. at 140-41 & n.4.
103 S. Ct. 3176-86.
'' Id. at 3182-84.
"' Id. at 3177-81.
"3 427 U.S. at 152-53.
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The Court first recognized the right to hire permanent replacements during an
economic strike in NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. 124 In finding this action permissible,
the Mackay Court balanced the employer's interest in hiring workers to continue its
business operations against the negative impact of the hires on union activity and strikers'
rights under the NLRA.'" The Court determined that the need to entice workers to take
the replacement positions so the business could continue to operate was a sufficient
business justification for permanently replacing strikers.'" Such permanent replacements
need not be discharged, the Court maintained, to make room for economic strikers who
request reinstatement.' 27 Replacements hired on a temporary basis, the Court noted, must
be discharged if strikers make an unconditional offer to return to work or the strike is
settled." 9
Although the Mackay Court found that the employer could hire permanent replace-
ments because it had a substantial business reason, the NLRB has treated the hiring of
permanent replacements as a legal right of the employer." 9 A court will not inquire into
the motive of the employer or require the employer to show that the only way it could
obtain replacements was through an offer of permanent employment.i 3" Rather, hiring
permanent replacements is viewed as an economic weapon available for use by the
employer in resisting a union's use of economic pressure. 131
In Belknap v. Hale Belknap used the economic weapon of hiring permanent replace-
ment workers during the strike by the Union.' 32 Although Belknap's action might have
124 Id.
1 'b 304 U.S. 333, 345-47 (1938). The right may only be used in an economic strike, a strike to
gain economic benefits. An employer may not exercise this right to hire permanent replacements in
an unfair labor practice strike, a strike in protest of or caused by an employer's violation of the
NLRA. Id. at 345; see also Giddings & Lewis, Inc. v. NLRB, 675 F.2d 926, 929 n.8 (7th Cir. 1982) ("By
restricting this right to employers 'guilty of no act denounced by the statute,' the Court limited its
analysis to economic strike replacements."); Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 278 (1956)
(in the event of an unfair labor practice strike, an employer must offer reinstatement to all strikers).
304 U.S. at 345-46. See also Giddings & Lewis, Inc. v. NLRB, 675 F.2d 926, 929 (7th Cir.
1982). The Court stated:
Subsequent cases have read Mackay as employing a balancing test in arriving at the
conclusion that the hiring of replacement workers was permissible under the Act. This
balancing test weighed the inevitable negative impact on union activity of hiring
permanent replacement workers against the business justification for doing so.
Id.
127 304 U.S. at 345-46. The Court stated:
Hlt does not follow that an employer, guilty of no act denounced by the statute, has lost
the right to protect and continue this business by supplying places left vacant by strikers
and he is not bound to discharge those hired to fill the places of strikers, upon the
election of the latter to resume their employment, in order to create places for them.
Id.
128 Id.
1" Id. ar 346-47. See also NLRB v. Mars Sales & Equipment Co., 626 F.2d 567 (7th Cir. 1980).
1" E.g., Hot Shoppes, Inc., 146 N.L.R.B. 802, 805, 55 L.R.R.M. 1419, 1420 (1964).
"' Id. "IT]he motive for such replacements is immaterial; absent evidence of an independent,
unlawful purpose." Id. For an example of failure to inquire into the motives or reasons for the
employer's hires, see American Optical Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 681, 689, 50 L.R.R.M. 1332, 1332-33
(1962).
'3  Penn. Glass Sand Corp., 172 N.L.R.B. 514, 70 L.R.R.M. 1281 (available in L.R.R.M. in
summary form only) (1968). The Board stated:
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been found lawful had the NLRB adjudicated the strike to be an economic strike, Belknap
agreed to reinstate all the strikers as part of the settlement agreement between Belknap
and the Union. 133 As a result of agreeing to reinstatement, however, Belknap found it
necessary to lay off its newly hired permanent replacements.'" These replacements
brought state court actions against Belknap for breach of contract and misrepresenta-
tion.'" In defense, Belknap sought to have the Court find that federal labor law preemp-
ted the replacement workers suit. Both the Gannon and Machinists doctrines were used by
the Belknap Court to analyze whether a state cause of action which impacted on an
employer's Mackay right to hire permanent replacements should be preempted.
Il. THE BELXNAP DECISION
In the Belknap decision the Supreme Court held that the NLRA does not preempt
state misrepresentation and breach of contract actions brought against an employer by
permanent strike replacements who are displaced by reinstated strikers.'" Guided by the
preemption doctrines in Machinists, the Court considered whether the replacements' state
claims regulated the hiring of permanent replacements, an unregulated economic
weapon, and must therefore, be preempted.' 37
 Introducing a balancing test to Machinists,
the Court found that Congress could not have intended injuries to innocent third parties
to go unremedied, so Machinists did not preempt the state actions.'" According to the
Court, application of the Garmon doctrine also sustained the state cause of action.'"
Although the state claims regulated the hiring of permanent replacements, the same
conduct which caused unfair labor practice charges to be before the NLRB, the Court
concluded that the state claims were not identical to the claims which might have been
presented to the NLRB and so were not preempted."" The Court also found that an
employer could make conditioned offers of employment and still refuse to reinstate
strikers thus changing the Mackay economic weapon rule."'
Writing for the majority, Justice White began the Court's analysis by reviewing
current labor preemption law as set forth in Garmon and Machinists."' Under Garmon, the
Court recognized, state regulation is presumptively preempted if it concerns conduct that
is actually or arguably regulated by the Act.'" The Court stated, however, that if the
conduct is of great local concern and only peripherally related to the Act, the state's
interest must be balanced against any interference with the NLRB's function and the risk
In Hot Shoppes there was a certified union and the strike occurred in the course of
contract negotiations. The strikers were warned in advance that they would be perma-
nently replaced if they went on strike. Hot Shoppes thus presented a classically simple
case of economic warfare; with the employer using established means of resisting the
union's economic pressure in support of its demands.
172 N.L.R.B. at 535.
1' See supra notes 22-35 and accompanying text.
134 See supra notes 22-35 and accompanying text.
135 See supra notes 22-35 and accompanying text.
138 See supra notes 22-35 and accompanying text.
131
 1 03 S. Ct. at 3174-78.
' 38 Id.
'39 Id.
149 Id.
'4 ' Id.
"2 Id.
143
 Id. at 3177-78.
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that the state will sanction conduct permitted by the Act.'" The Machinists doctrine, the
Court found, would operate to proscribe state regulation of conduct Congress intended
to leave unregulated as part of the self-help remedies for combatants in labor disputes." 5
After reviewing the preemption doctrines the Court addressed Belknap's arguments
for preemption under the Machinists doctrine.'" Belknap argued that both of the re-
placements' state actions impermissably regulated and burdened the employer's economic
weapon of hiring permanent replacement workers and should be preempted by the
Machinists doctrine."7 This economic weapon, Belknap asserted, was intentionally left
unregulated by Congress. 148 The Court acknowledged that federal law permits an em-
ployer to hire permanent replacements and to retain such replacements over economic
strikers,'" but rejected Belknap's argument that the state court suits were impermissible
attempts to regulate the hire of permanent replacements.'" Federal law, the Court
declared, could not insist on permanent offers on the one hand and forbid damage suits
for breach of such promises on the other hand.' 5 ' Moreover, while federal law intended to
leave the employer and union free to use their economic weapons against one another,
the Court stated, federal law did not intend to allow either party to injure innocent third
parties without penalty. 15 ' On the basis of this analysis the Court found that the Machinists
doctrine should not preempt a state cause of action which protects or remedies the rights
of third parties and has only minimal impact on the employer's economic weapon.'" The
Court also rejected Belknap's argument that the federal labor policy of encouraging
settlement of labor disputes could preempt a state cause of action protecting third
parties.'"
Having generally dismissed Belknap's arguments under Machinists, the Court then
considered Belknap's arguments that permitting state suits would weaken the employers'
position during a strike. 15" Belknap argued that if the Court permitted the replacements'
state actions employers would be deterred from making offers of permanent employment
or would be forced to condition the offers by stating the circumstances under which
replacements must be fired.'" Refuting Belknap's contention that conditioning the offers
would considerably weaken the employer's position, the Court stated that under the
'" Id.
145 Id
' 46 Id.
147 Id. at 3177-78.
t" Id.
'" Id.
15° Id.
151 Id. "It is asserted . . . that entertaining the action against Belknap was an impermissible
attempt by the Kentucky courts to regulate and burden one of the employer's primary weapons
during an economic strike, that is, the right to hire replacements .... We are unpersuaded."
157 Id.
'53 Id. The Court stated, "[vi]e cannot agree with the dissent that Congress intended such a
lawless regime." Id.
'54 Id.
m The Court observed:
We do not think the normal contractual rights and other usual legal interests of the
replacements can be so easily disposed of by broad-brush assertions that no legal rights
may accrue to them during a strike because federal law has privileged the "permanent"
hiring of replacements and encourages settlement.
Id.
1" Id. at 3178-79.
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present NLRB interpretation of federal labor law, offers of permanent employment to
replacements were subject to implied conditions.'" Belknap and the NLRB had argued
that, as a matter of federal law, an employer may terminate replacements without liability
in the event of a settlement or an NLRB finding of an unfair labor practice strike.'" The
Court maintained that if this interpretation was correct future replacement offerees
would be likely to assume the impermanency of their positions, and many might refuse
the offers of employment.'"
Thus the Court found, under the Board's interpretation of the law, offers to perma-
nent replacements would, as a matter of law, be no more permanent than if they were
expressly conditioned on settlement with the Union.'" The Court suggested that the
employer make its offers of permanent employment expressly conditioned upon settle-
ment with the union or upon an NLRB finding of an unfair labor practice strike. 16 ' Such
offers would avoid misrepresentation problems, and would not, in the Court's view, make
obtaining replacements any more difficult than impliedly conditional offers like those in
Belknap.'" The state regulation, the Court reasoned, does not infringe on the employer's
economic weapon because the employer can easily avoid such infringement by condition-
ing its offers. Therefore, the Court reasoned, preempting the state causes of action is
unnecessary.'"
The majority concluded that Belknap had not offered any substantial case authority to
justify preemption under the Machinists doctrine.'" The Court proceeded to analyze the
Belknap facts under the Garmon doctrine.'" According to this doctrine, the Court ex-
plained, state regulations and causes of action are presumptively preempted if they
concern conduct that is arguably regulated by the NLRA.'" The Court reemphasized the
doctrine from Sears that the critical inquiry in applying the Garman rules is whether the
controversy presented to the state court is identical to that which could be presented to
the NLRB.'" Under Garman, the Court stated, a balancing test may be applied which
sustains the action where the regulated conduct is deeply rooted in local interests and is of
only peripheral concern to federal labor law.'"
Addressing Belknap's argument that the replacements' misrepresentation action
regulated conduct also regulated by the NLRA and should be preempted under the
Garman doctrine, the Court held that this state cause of action should be sustained.'"
157 Id.
l" Id. The NLRB expressed its interpretation in an amicus brief on behalf of Belknap. Id. at
3177-78.
159 Id.
16° Id.
"' Id. at 3179 ("Belknap's promises, although in a form assuring permanent employment,
would as a matter of law be non-permanent to the same extent as they would be if expressly
conditioned on the eventuality of settlement requiring reinstatement of strikers and on its obligation
to reinstate unfair labor practice strikers.").
L07 Id. at 3177-78.
1"
 Id. at 3178-79, 3179 n.7.
164 Id. at 3178-79. The Court also commented that conditional offers would promote the
NLRB's policy of encouraging settlement because an employer that did not fear liability from
discharged replacements would be more willing to reinstate strikers and settle the strike. Id.
"3 Id.
768 Id.
1" Id. at 3180-86.
168 Id. at 3182-84.
1 °9 Id.
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Although, as the Court recognized, the NLRB could have determined that the Belknap
employment offers were unfair labor practices, the Court found that the matter as
presented to the NLRB would not be identical to the issue before the state court.'" The
NLRB, the Court explained, would focus only on whether the rights of the strikers had
been harmed. 17 ' The state court, in contrast, the Court noted, would be able to offer the
replacements relief for the harm resulting from the misrepresentation.'" The state
action, the Court concluded, would not infringe on the NLRB's exclusive jurisdiction.'"
In addition, the Court noted that the state had a substantial interest in protecting its
citizens from harmful misrepresentations.' 74 The Belknap Court concluded that the state
interests outweighed any federal concern for interference with the NLRB's function.'"
The Court then proceeded to apply Cannon to the breach of contract action.'"
Belknap argued that the Cannon doctrine preempted this cause of action.'" According to
Belknap, had the NLRB found it guilty of unfair labor practices, it could have ordered it
to reinstate all the strikers.'" This reinstatement would have left no room for the
replacements.'" Although the Court recognized this possibility it stated that, in its view,
the replacements' suit for damages could be maintained without interfering with the
NLRB's power to decide any unfair labor practice claims.'" Since the replacements' suit
for breach of contract would not infringe on the rights of either the strikers or the
employer, nor would it frustrate any federal labor law policy, the Court concluded that no
basis for preemption existed and the replacements' breach of contract action must be
sustained.'"
The Belknap Court, in conclusion, sustained the replacements' misrepresentation and
breach of contract actions because the Court found no grounds for preemption under
Machinists or Gannon."' Furthermore, the Court suggested that in future labor disputes
employers could avoid liability to replacement employees by conditioning their offers of
permanent employment on either a failure to settle with the union or the failure of the
NLRB to find an unfair labor practice strike. 183 Finally, the Court indicated that such
conditional offers would be considered sufficiently permanent to allow the employer to
refuse reinstatement to strikers if the employer is not found guilty of unfair practices,
does not settle with the union, or settles without a promise to reinstate strikers.'"
In a concurring opinion, justice Blackmun agreed with the majority's conclusion that
the replacements' causes of action were not preempted under federal law.'" Justice
Blackmun disagreed, however, with the majority's suggestions that employers could make
1711 Id.
171 Id.
'' Id.
173 id.
174 Id.
175 Id .
178 Id.
In Id. at 3183-85.
L ." Id. at 3183-84.
179
Id.
181 Id.
i°" Id. at 3184.
la3 Id.
1" Id. at 3179-81.
'" Id, at 3178-80, 3180 n.8.
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conditional offers of employment in the future which would allow the employer to refuse
to reinstate stikers in an economic strike.'" According to Justice Blackmun, if the em-
ployer made conditional offers there would be no business justification for refusing to
reinstate strikers.' 97
Justice Blackmun reviewed in detail the problem of offers to the replacements.' 89 He
noted that, under federal labor law, an employer may only deny reinstatement to an
economic striker by showing legitimate and substantial business justification.' 89 The em-
ployer may refuse reinstatement if it has promised permanent employment to the re-
placements, Justice Blackmun explained, because such promises may be necessary to
entice workers to accept employment.' 90
 Offers of conditional employment, suggested by
the majority, would not in Justice Blackmun's view, be a sufficient business justification to
deny reinstatement to a striker.' In addition, Justice Blackmun commented, retaining
the replacements instead of reinstating strikers when the employer has not promised to
do so would be an unfair labor practice.' 92
According to Justice Blackmun, the majority's change in the rules respecting perma-
nent offers to sustain the state action was unnecessary.' 93
 Rather, Justice Blackmun
suggested that the state causes of action complemented rather than conflicted with federal
law.' 94
 Justice Blackmun explained that the employer's offers of permanent employment
must be enforceable under state law to be credible and thus serve to entice workers to take
the jobs." The employer's potential liability to the replacements, Justice Blackmun
reasoned, provides another business justification to refuse to reinstate strikers. 196 The
potential liability under the contractual obligation to the replacements, concluded Justice
Blackmun, supports the rationale for permitting Mackay offers of permanent employ-
ment to be used to avoid reinstating strikers. 197
Finally, Justice Blackmun recognized that the NLRB, in an unfair labor practice
action, could require an employer to reinstate strikers and discharge replacements.'"
Justice Blackmun stated, however, that this fact should not preempt the replacements'
state causes of action. 199
 Federal labor policy did not intend, Justice Blackmun reasoned,
that an employer's unfair labor practices should shield it from a state cause of action for
da mages . 299
In conclusion, Justice Blackmun agreed with the majority that the respondent's
claims were not preempted."U 1
 Justice Blackmun disagreed with the majority's finding that
' 9' Id. at 3186-87 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
1 " Id. at 3184-85 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
's" Id. at 3185-86 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
199 Id. at 3184-89 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
190 Id. at 3185-86 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
' 9  Id.
192 Id. at 3184-88 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
193 Id. at 3186-88 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
194 Id.
19' Id. at 3187 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("Mt is difficult to explain the employer's power to
prefer permanent strike replacements over returning strikers unless, through the promise of per-
manent employment, the employer has incurred an obligation to those replacements.").
196 Id. at 3187-88 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
' 97 Id.
1" Id. at 3188-89 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
"9 Id.
100 Id.
201 As Justice Blackmun explained:
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conditional offers could be considered to provide a business justification for refusing
reinstatement to strikers."' To so hold, Justice Blackmun argued, would be inconsistent
with the rationale behind considering permanent offers a substantial business justification
for failing to reinstate strikers.'"
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Powell, dissented, arguing that the
state causes of action were preempted by federal labor law.'" The dissent asserted that
the replacements' claims were preempted because the claims had the potential of subject-
ing the employer to conflicting state and federal regulation if the NLRB found Belknap
committed unfair labor practices. The claims should also be preempted, the dissent
found, because they threatened the efficient administration of the NLRA, and altered the
balance of the economic weapons provided by Congress.'"
To explain its position, the dissent conducted its own analysis of Belknap under both
Garmon and Machinists.' The dissent chose to begin with an analysis of the replacements'
breach of contract claim under the Gannon doctrine."7
 Belknap arguably committed an
unfair labor practice, the dissent stated, when it raised the wages of non-striking union
employees."" Therefore, according to the dissent, federal law could have required
Belknap to reinstate all strikers and incidentally to breach its contracts with the replace-
ments."9
 If Belknap could be found liable in state court for breach of contract, the dissent
asserted, then Belknap potentially would be subject to conflicting state and federal
regulation."" Thus, the dissent concluded, because the state action would be regulating
conduct which could also be regulated under the NLRA, the replacements' claim must be
preempted.'"
The dissent also criticized the Court's application of the Garmon doctrine to the
replacements' misrepresentation claims.'" Because making misrepresentations is not an
activity even arguably regulated by the NLRA, the dissent asserted, the Gannon doctrine
should not be applied." 13
 Instead, the dissent explained, activity left unregulated by the
NLRA should be analyzed under the Machinists doctrine.'" The activity of concern in
Belknap, the hiring of permanent replacements, the dissent claimed, is an economic
weapon Congress left unregulated as part of the balance of power between labor and
management established by the Act.'" Therefore, the dissent concluded, Machinists is
Federal law did not require the employer to make the promise or to commit unfair
labor practices .... If federal law recognizes that the employer voluntarily has
undertaken an obligation to the replacements, the fact that the employer commits an
unfair labor practice making it impossible for him to fulfill that obligation should not
shield the employer from compensating the replacement employees.
Id. at 3188-89 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Id. at 3186-88 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 3190-3200 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 3190-91 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 3190-3200 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 3192 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 3192-95 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 3192 -97 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id.
202
203
204
205
200
297
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
212
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applicable.'" According to the dissent, potential liability under a state claim could cause
an employer to forego hiring permanent replacements except when it was absolutely clear
there was no possibility of forced reinstatement of strikers in NLRB proceedings.'"
Allowing replacements' claims, the dissent stated, would burden the employer's use of an
economic weapon and distort the "delicate balance struck by the Act between the rights of
labor and management in a labor dispute."78
The dissent also criticized the majority's suggestion that employers make conditional
offers of employment to replacements.'" This action would, the dissent stated, upset the
balance of power between unions and management as established by the NLRA. 7° Under
the majority's rule, the dissent observed, the employer need no longer show the business
justification that permanent offers were necessary to obtain employees.'" Allowing condi-
tional offers, the dissent found, would weaken the strikers' position."' The conditional
offers, the dissent noted, could also weaken the usefulness of the employers' right to hire
permanent replacements. 223 If the employer conditioned its offers, the dissent explained,
they would be less attractive to workers."24 The pre -Belknap definition of permanency, the
dissent contended, dealt with these problems more adequately." 8 Under that definition,
the dissent asserted, replacements were permanent unless the union pressured the em-
ployer into a settlement including reinstatement or the NLRB forced reinstatement of
strikers in an unfair labor practice proceeding. 78
The dissent addressed the Court's concern for the rights of the replacement workers
under the traditional rules of permanency. 77 In the dissent's view, the reality that a
replacement's employment status is tenuous is probably understood by most replace-
rnents.2 " 8 While protecting replacements might make a better world, the dissent con-
cluded, such protection is inappropriate if accomplished by altering the balance of power
between labor and managemen028 The replacements' claims should be preempted, the
dissent argued, because such claims subject employees to conflicting federal and state
regulations and interfere with the administration of the NLRA. 33° The majority's sugges-
tion of conditional offers must be rejected, the dissent stated, because such offers upset
the balance of power between labor and management as established in the NLRA. 2"
21 " Id. at 3195-97 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
217 Id.	 1-
21ii Id.
2 " Id. at 3195-98 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
2=0 Id. at 3197-98 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
221 Id.
222. Id.
' 23 Id.
"4 To avoid misrepresentation claims, an employer might decide not to hire replacements on a
permanent basis or to hire permanent replacements only in cases in which it is absolutely clear that
the strike is an economic one. Either of these developments would mean that the employers were
being inhibited by state law from making full use of an economic weapon available to them under
federal law. Moreover, if an employer decided not to hire replacements on a permanent basis, its
ability to hire replacements might be affected adversely. Id. at 3196-97 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
22• Id. at 3196-98 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
2" Id. at 3197-3200 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
227 Id. at 3199-3200 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
228 Id.
19 Id. at 3200 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F.2d 862,
871 (2d Cir. 1938) (Learned Hand, J.)).
230 Id.
231 Id.
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In summation, the dissent found that the labor law preemption doctrines required
the replacements' breach of contract and misrepresentation claims to be preempted."'
The breach of contract claim, the dissent found, was preempted by the Garmon doctrine
because the claim subjected the employer to conflicting state and federal regulation in the
event of an unfair labor practice adjudication.'" The dissent found the replacements'
misrepresentation claim to be preempted under the Machinists doctrine."4 Such claims
had the potential, the dissent observed, for inhibiting the employer's hiring of permanent
replacements, an economic weapon which Congress intended to leave unregulated, and
thus must be preempted. 23
In the Belknap decision the majority and dissent differed both in their method of
applying the Garmon and Machinists preemption doctrines and their results:236 Applying
the Machinists doctrine, the Court considered not only whether the state action would
have a regulatory effect on an employer's economic weapon but also weighed the state's
interest in protecting its citizens.' 37 In addition, the Court examined the extent of the
burden of the state's regulation on the economic weapon.' 36 After consideration of all
these factors the Court determined that the replacements' state claims should not be
preempted by the Machinists doctrine.'-239 The Court then took additional action to insure
that the employer's economic weapon and the state claims could coexist.'" In the future,
the Court stated, employers could make conditional offers of employment to replacement
workers and refuse to reinstate strikers during an economic strike.'
In contrast, the dissent strictly applied the Machinists doctrine to the replacements'
misrepresentation claims."' The dissent found that the misrepresentation claim regu-
lated the employers' economic weapon and so must be preempted under that doctrine.'"
Unlike the majority, the dissent did not weigh the state's interest in its analysis. Further-
more, the dissent criticized the majority's conclusion that in the future conditional offers
of permanent employment could permit the employer to refuse reinstatement to strik-
en.244
The majority and dissent also differed in their analysis under the Cannon doctrine.
Applying the narrowed Garman doctrine as expressed in Sears, the majority found that
neither of the replacements claims could be preempted.'" Because the replacements
claims were not identical to those which could be presented before the NLRB, the Court
stated, preemption was not required.'"
The dissent applied the Garman doctrine only to the breach of contract action having
found that only this cause of action regulated conduct also regulated by the NLRA.
Because the NLRB had the potential power to order reinstatement of strikers and
"1 Id.
2" See supra notes 204-31 and accompanying text.
224 See supra notes 207-12 and accompanying text.
235 See supra notes 212-31 and accompanying text.
2" See supra notes 212-31 and accompanying text.
237 See supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
'38 See supra notes 155-59 and accompanying text.
2" See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
140 See supra notes 160-63 and accompanying text.
'' See supra notes 160-63 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 213-18 and accompanying text.
2" See supra notes 215-17 and accompanying text.
244 See supra notes 219-26 and accompanying text.
245 See supra notes 169-81 and accompanying text.
' 40 See supra notes 169-81 and accompanying text.
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indirectly cause the replacements to be fired, the dissent found that the Garmon doctrine
required preemption."' In reaching this conclusion, the dissent chose not to apply the
narrow test set forth in Sears but rather applied the general policy underlying Garmon of
avoiding conflicting state and federal regulation.
III. APPLICATION OF LABOR PREEMPTION DOCTRINES IN BELKNAP
The dispute in Belknap concerned Belknap's offers of permanent employment to
replacements and the company's subsequent discharge of those replacements." 8 The
replacements brought misrepresentation and breach of contract actions against Belknap
in state court which Belknap challenged by claiming the actions were preempted by
federal labor law." 8 When a court is presented with a labor law preemption problem, its
first task is to classify the conduct involved in the dispute. If the conduct is at least
arguably covered by the NLRA, the Gannon doctrine is applied to the facts of the case to
determine if preemption is warranted:25° If the activity is related to a labor dispute, but is
not covered by the NLRA, the Machinists doctrine is used to test whether preemption is
required.251 In Belknap, the Court examined the conduct regulated by the state claims, the
hiring of permanent replacements, and found that this conduct required using both the
Garmon and Machinists doctrines . 252 When the Court used the Garman doctrine it adjudged
whether the state actions wrongly regulated the unfair labor practice of hiring replace-
ments during an unfair labor practice strike, conduct already regulated under the
NLRA.783 In contrast, in applying the Machinists doctrine the Court considered whether
the state actions impermissably regulated the economic weapon of hiring replacements in
an economic strike, an area Congress left unregulated.'-'S4 Applying the Garmon doctrine,
as modified by Sears, the Court correctly found that the state causes of action did not
impermissably regulate conduct also regulated by the NLRA because the state claims did
not meet the test of being identical to actions which could have been brought before the
NLRB.'" In finding that Cannon did not preempt the replacements' claims, however, the
Court ignored a risk of subjecting employers to conflicting state and federal regulation, a
risk the Carmen test was created to avoid.' 88 Thus, the Court missed an opportunity to
correct the deficiencies inherent in the Gannon doctrine as modified by Sears."' The
Court's analysis of Belknap under the Machinists doctrine, in contrast, modified that
preemption test to include a balancing of state and federal interests." 8 While analyzing
the state's regulation of the economic weapon of hiring replacements the Court weighed
the state's interest in protecting third parties against the federal labor policy of leaving
this conduct unregulated." 9 Introduction of this balancing test should lead to an increase
in permissible state regulation of economic weapons. Finally, in sustaining the replace-
247 See supra notes 208-11 and accompanying text.
24 ' 103 S. Ct. at 3175-76.
2" Id.
"° Id. at 3177-78.
" 1 Id.
'" Id. at 3180-84.
253 Id .
2" Id.
"' See infra notes 261-69 and accompanying text.
"6 See infra notes 269-74 and accompanying text.
2" See infra notes 269-74 and accompanying text.
266 See infra notes 274-90 and accompanying text.
259 See infra notes 274-90 and accompanying text.
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ments' claims the Belknap Court strengthened the employer's economic weapon of hiring
replacements when it found that conditional rather than permanent offers were sufficient
to permit an employer to refuse reinstatement to strikers. 260
A. Garmon and Sears
•	 The Court applied the Gannon doctrine to both the misrepresentation and breach of
contract claim because the conduct underlying those claims was arguably regulated by the
NLRA." 1 Hiring the replacements and offering permanent employment would have
been prohibited by the Act if the NLRB had found an unfair labor practice strike."' By
contrast, had the NLRB found that the employer committed unfair labor practices, the
breach of contract and the discharge of the replacements would have been required by
federal labor law." 3
Having found that the conduct was arguably regulated by the NLRA, the Court then
applied the Garman test as modified by Sears, to determine the preemption question.'"
Under this mechanical test, the Court found that the state cause of action was not identical
to the action the NLRB could adjudicate and, therefore, the state claims should be
sustained.' In Belknap, the Board action, had it not been settled in conference, would
have focused on the protection of strikers' rights against unfair labor practices by the
employer!" The state court, however, would adjudicate the rights of the replacement
workers."' Having found no conflict in the two adjudications, the Court, correctly
applying Sears, sustained the state causes of action.'" The policy behind Sears, to protect
the exclusivity of the Board's jurisdiction was not violated by this result. " 66
Deciding the preemption question by the Sears test, however, ignores the conflict of
the state action with federal labor policy. The Sears requirement that the controversy be
identical to the action that would have been presented to the NLRB prevents the Court
from preempting the state action because of an indirect impact on the actors in a labor
dispute. This indirect impact, though accomplished by a third party suit as it was in
Belknap, could detrimentally affect the rights given to labor and management through
federal labor policy. Such a result is at odds with the Gannon doctrine developed by the
Court to prevent such dual and conflicting regulation. In Belknap the employer was
potentially subject to dual regulation of its activities." 70 Under federal regulation the
266 See infra notes 287-90 and accompanying text.
261 See infra notes 287-90 and accompanying text.
262 103 S. Ct. at 3180-82.
"3 Id.
264 Id. at 3182-84.
"5 Id.
'"' Id.
267 Id.
266 Id.
1" 436 U.S. at 197.
The critical inquiry, therefore, is . , whether the controversy presented to the state
court is identical to ... or different from . , . that which could have been, but was not,
presented to the Labor Board. For it is only in the former situation that a state court's
exercise of jurisdiction necessarily involves a risk of interference with the unfair labor
practices jurisdiction of the Board which the arguably prohibited branch of the Garmon
doctrine was designed to avoid.
Id.
2" 103 S. Ct. at 3192 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Board in Belknap could have found that the Union's strike was in protest of an unfair
labor practice."' The offers to replacements would then have been unfair labor practices
and to remedy those practices the NLRB would have required the discharge of replace-
ments to make room for returning strikers.'" Discharging the replacements, however,
would have subjected, as the replacements state claims illustrate, the employer in Belknap
to state law claims for damages.'" As recognized by the dissent, such conflicting regula-
tion of conduct is unfair to the employer and contradicts the policy underlying the
Garmon doctrine. 74 In choosing to follow the narrow test set forth in Sears the Court
seems to have lost sight of the Garnion policy of avoiding conflict between federal and state
regulation. The Belknap Court apparently failed to recognize the deficiencies of the Sears
test and so missed an opportunity to reinstate the Gannon policy of preventing conflicts
between state and federal labor policy.
B. Machinists
The Belknap Court also analyzed the replacements' claims under Machinists."' Under
Machinists conduct not covered by the NLRA may nonetheless be immune to state
regulation if the conduct is part of the economic warfare between a union and an
employer left unregulated by the NLRA. 2" Congress intended to leave these forms of
self-help unregulated and subject to the play of economic forces." 77 In Machinists the
Court recognized the necessity of prohibiting regulation of economic weapons to avoid
disrupting the balance of power between union and management established by federal
labor law . 278
Belknap involved the economic weapon of hiring permanent replacements."'" The
Supreme Court recognized the employer's right to hire permanent replacements as a
legitimate weapon in Mackay.' Machinists recognized that Congress intended no regula-
tion of economic weapons.' 81 Belknap, therefore, should have been able to use this
weapon without fear of state interference. Strictly applied, Machinists would appear to
require preemption of the replacements' claim?'"
Nevertheless, the Court did not preempt the state action in Belknap." Instead, the
271 See supra notes 207-11 and accompanying text.
272 See supra notes 207-11 and accompanying text.
"5 103 S. Ct. at 3193-97.
274 • s Justice  Brennan stated in his dissent, "Mespondents' breach of contract claim seeks to
regulate activity that may well have been required by federal law. Petitioner may have to answer in
damages for taking such an action. This sort of conflicting regulation is intolerable." Id. at 3192
(Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Garnwn, 359 U.S. at 241-42 ("In determining the extent to which
state regulation must yield to subordinating federal authority, we have been concerned with delimit-
ing areas of potential conflict; potential conflict of rules of law, of remedy, and of administration.").
"5 103 S. Ct. at 3178-79.
27" Id. at 140 & n.4. Economic weapons are activities used by either union or management to
exert economic pressure on each other; examples include strikes, lockouts, and hiring replacements.
See Cox, supra note 101, at 1346.
"7 Machinists, 427 U.S. at 140 & n.4.
"79 Id. at 148-51. See also Comment, supra note 85, at 955.
5" 103 S. Ct. at 3178-79.
304 U.S. at 345-46.
"' 427 U.S. at 148-51.
2" Id. See also Belknap, 103 S. Ct. at 3196-97 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"3 103 S. Ct. at 3178-79.
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Court introduced a new factor into the Machinists analysis, by considering whether
Congress could have intended to permit the economic weapon to impact on "innocent
third parties."'" Such an inquiry is similar to the balancing test the Court employed in the
Garmon analysis.'" Under Garman, the Court will permit state regulation of conduct
arguably protected or prohibited under the Act if the state action concerns conduct
having great local concern and having only peripheral impact on the Act.'" This excep-
tion to the Garmon test has permitted the Court to allow increased state regulation of
strikers' activities; state causes of action for and injunctions against mass picketing and
violence,'"' intentional infliction of emotional distress,"" and trespass .'" have been sus-
tained under the balancing test. Introduction of this type of balancing to the Machinists
analysis may lead to a similar increase in the permissible state regulation of economic
warfare.
The consideration of state interests by the Court is new to Machinists preemption
analysis. Previously, if the conduct was intended to be unregulated state action was
preempted." 9° In Belknap, however, the Court recognized the activity as an unregulated
economic weapon but permitted state regulation because the state interest in protecting
the replacement workers appeared to outweigh any harm to federal labor policy.'" If the
Court continues or expands upon the precedent established in Belknap, it may allow
increasing degrees of state regulation. Belknap has the potential for opening the door for
increased state regulation in areas previously protected from state regulation under the
theory that Congress left the area unregulated.
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF BEL KNAP ON THE RIGHT TO HIRE PERMANENT REPLACEMENTS
Had the Belknap Court chosen to preempt the replacements' state actions, it would
have maintained the NLRB's interpretation of the law and the existing interpretation of
Machinists. 29' The employer would be free to hire permanent replacements in an eco-
nomic strike and to refuse to reinstate replaced strikers.'" Offers of permanent rather
than expressly temporary jobs would enable the employer to attract workers more
This economic weapon could be used to put pressure on the strikers to end their
strike.'" Under the NLRB's interpretation of the law the replacements' jobs were perma-
Id. at 3177-78.
"5 See supra notes 69-96 and accompanying text.
359 U.S. at 243-44.
UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958).
' 88
 Farmers v. United Board of Carpenters & Joiners, Local 25, 430 U.S. 290 (1977).
'"" Sears, 436 U.S. 180.
290 427 U.S. at 148-51. See also Belknap, 103 S. Ct. at 3196-97 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
291
 103 S. Ct. at 3177-78.
'92 Id. at 3197- 98 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"t93 Mackay, 304 U.S. at 345-47; Administrative Ruling of NLRB General Counsel No. F-188, 41
L.R.R.M. 1024 (1958).
' 94
 NLRB v. Mars Sales & Equipment Co., 626 F.2d 567, 572 (7th Cir. 1980). "The rationale for .
.. this . . . is that the employer's interest in continuing his business during a strike and the needed
inducement of permanent employment to obtain replacements is a sufficient business justification
overcoming protection for economic strikers." Id. This business reason is assumed by the courts and
need not be proved in each case. Hot Shoppes, Inc., 146 N.L.R.B. 802, 805, 55 L.R.R.M. 1419, 1420
(1964).
"5
 Penn. Glass Sand Corp., 172 N.L.R.B. 514, 535 (1968).
December 1984]
	 CASENOTES
	
85
nent unless the employer was forced to reinstate strikers by the economic pressure of the
strike or an unfair labor practice adjudication by the NLRB.""
The Court changed this law to permit an employer to refuse to reinstate strikers
during an economic strike even though the employer had conditioned its offers of
employment upon failure to settle the strike with the union or failure of the NLRB to find
an unfair labor practice strike. If, instead, the Court had chosen merely to sustain the
state actions without changing the law regarding the hiring of permanent replacements
the utility of the employer's economic weapon would have been substantially reduced. 97
Cautious employers would hesitate to employ the weapon because of the potential future
liability."" The employer could have unexpected liability, for example, if the strikers were
able to apply sufficient economic pressure to force the employer to agree to reinstate-
ment. 259 Given the uncertain nature of most strikes, moreover, the employer could be
faced with an unexpected unfair labor practice adjudication and potential liability to
replacements if it were required to discharge them to make room for strikers." Rather
than risk such liability the employer would likely forego the economic weapon and hire
only temporary replacements."' Since temporary replacements must be discharged in
every case to make room for returning.strikers such positions would be less attractive to
workers and therefore harder to fill. 3"2 By merely sustaining the state action without
introducing the notion of conditional offers, the Court would have weakened the useful-
ness to employers of this economic weapon approved in Mackay.
Sustaining the state action also negatively affects the strikers' position. In the in-
stances in which the employer did make permanent offers the employer would be able to
resist more strongly a strike settlement requiring reinstatement." 3 The employer's poten-
tial liability to the replacements would permit the employer to extract great concessions
from the union for agreeing to reinstate the strikers or perhaps cause the employer to
resist reinstatement."'
The Belknap Court sustained the replacements' state actions but altered the poten-
tially harsh results of that decision."' The Court preserved and strengthened the employ-
' 103 S. Ct. at 3199-3200 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Any potential liability to the replacements
has not been used as a business justification. The NLRB and the courts' lack of concern for employer
liability may be explained by the existence of the at will employment doctrine. Under the at will
employment doctrine courts have ruled that an employee cannot claim damages for dismissal from a
permanent position. This rule applies even if the job was advertised as a permanent vacancy. See, e.g.,
Campion v. Boston & M.R.R., 259 Mass. 579, 169 N.E. 499, 500 (1930).
° 7 103 S. Gt. at 3196-97 (Brennan, j., dissenting).
"' Id.
299 Id.
" Id.
"1 Id.
'02 Id.
"3
 The dissent stated:
The force of these observations is apparent in this case. If an employer is confronted
with potential liability for•discharging workers he has hired to replace striking employ-
ees, he is likely to be much less willing to enter into a settlement agreement calling for
the dismissal of unfair labor practice charges and for the reinstatement of strikers.
Instead, he is much more likely to refuse to settle and to litigate the charges at issue
while retaining the replacements.
Id. at 3193-95 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
3°4 Id.
m Id. at 3177-82.
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er's Mackay weapon by suggesting that employers make conditional offers to replacements
in the future.308 These offers could still be used, the Belknap Court determined, to justify
refusing reinstatement to a striker. 307 The Court accomplished this change by reinterpret-
ing the definition of permanency under Mackay. 3" Under the Belknap Court's definition
an employer can offer permanent positions subject to its unilateral decision to dis-
charge."" Previously, the offers were subject to disfeasance only upon an unfair labor
practice adjudication or the application of economic pressure by the strikers. 310 The
Belknap majority's interpretation negates the business purpose stated in Mackay which
justified the use of this weapon. If the employer can now retain replacements who had no
expectation of a permanent position the Court has rejected the rationale in its Mackay
decision. In Mackay the Court reasoned that the employer's need to keep its business
operating by making attractive, permanent offers outweighed any infringement on the
strikers' rights. 3 "
By changing the permanency requirement so that it is subject to the unilateral
decisions of the employer, the Court has strengthened the employer's position. Under the
Court's interpretation of Mackay the employer who conditions its offers to replacements is
in a very good position at a strike settlement conference. The employer can apply
pressure to the strikers by lawfully refusing reinstatement or, if it is to the employer's
economic advantage, the employer can discharge the replacement. The fate of both
strikers and replacements is clearly in the employer's hands.
The Belknap Court's decision and suggestions implicitly change the definition of
permanency under Mackay . 3 ' 2 By directly addressing the Mackay issue the Court could
have avoided this result. The Court could have overruled Mackay, deciding that the need
to hire replacements was not a sufficient business justification to refuse reinstatement to
strikers. With such a decision, the Court could then have decided that since no economic
weapon was intended, no reason existed to preempt under Machinists . 3 ' 3 Eliminating the
right to hire replacements would have been only reassessing the Mackay Court's judgment
of what activities Congress intended to be unregulated economic weapons. 314
 Or, as the
dissent suggested, the Court could have recognized the Mackay right to hire permanent
replacements as an economic weapon and, under the Machinists doctrine, 313 preempted
the replacements' state actions. 316 Either of these options would have been less disruptive
to the balance of power established between employers and unions by Mackay than the
action taken by the Court which altered the rules governing the employer's economic
weapon. In addition, neither of these options would have detrimentally affected the
pre
-Belknap status of replacement workers.
CONCLUSION
The Belknap Court, faced with the question of whether the replacement workers
could bring state actions for misrepresentation and breach of contract against an em-
3 3
	 supra notes 182.84 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 182-84 and accompanying text.
3"8 103 S. Ct. at 3197-98 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
' Id. at 3197-98, 3198 n.13 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
3 " Id. at 3199-3200 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
311 See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
812 103 S. Ct. at 3198 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
313 See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
3" See suttrA. notes 124-28 and accompanying text.
315 See supra,notes 107-18 and accompanying text.
316 103 S. Ct. at -3196-97 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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ployer, decided that the actions were not preempted. 317 To reach this result the Court
altered the Machinists doctrine. 51 H A strict application of Machinists would have required
holding that hiring permanent replacements is an economic weapon and therefore state
actions regulating that weapon are preempted. 3 `" The Court, however, introduced a
balancing test to supplement the Machinists test which allowed the Court to sustain the
state action. 32° In an attempt to alleviate the impact of sustaining the state action on the
employer's right to hire replacements the Court reinterpreted the permanency require-
ment of Mackay to permit conditioned offers of employment."' The Court eliminated the
need for an employer to have a business justification to hire replacements and thus
strengthened the position of the employer visa vis striking workers. 3" The Court's action
seems inappropriate because it changes the balance of power between labor and man-
agement established by Congress. 323
The action taken by the Court in Belknap enabled it to avoid making the difficult
choice between either overruling Mackay and eliminating the right to hire permanent
replacements or retaining the weapon and recognizing its cost to replacements."' Either
of these choices, however, would have been preferable to the manipulation of federal
labor law necessary to reach the Court's result. Given that the Court found little credibility
in the employers' need to offer permanent employment to entice applicants for replace-
ment jobs, the logical choice for the Court would have been to overrule that part of
Mackay which recognized this economic weapon."' While this result would have altered
the present balance of power between labor and management this change is preferable
because it would have preserved rather than altered the Machinists doctrine as the Belknap
Court did. The Machinists doctrine is important to labor law policy because it prevents the
states from interfering with the economic warfare between labor and management,
conduct Congress intended to be unregulated. 336
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3 " See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
31 ' See supra notes 283-90 and accompanying text.
319 See supra note 282 and accompanying text.
323 See supra notes 279-82 and accompanying text.
' I See supra notes 283-89 and accompanying text.
3' See supra notes 30410 and accompanying text.
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